Marx's point is clear: the three key elements of materialism, namely, "the thing, reality, and sensuousness" can be apprehended neither as an object of reason nor intuitively contemplatively (Anschauung). It must be approached instead as activity, as praxis. Marx confirms this again in the fifth thesis, when he writes:
Feuerbach, not satisfied with abstract thinking, wants intuitioncontemplation (will die Anschauung); but he does not conceive sensuousness as practical, human-sensuous activity. (Marx and Engels 2008, 70) Marx's vocabulary is unequivocal: Feuerbach "wants" intuitioncontemplation (Anschauung) because on the one hand, abstraction has failed him, and on the other, he is incapable of conceiving materialism as praxis. In other words, Feuerbach "needs . . . " (will die . . . ) the grounding that intuitioncontemplation ( . . . Anschauung) provides without realizing that it is praxis that grounds materialism.
1 The 1845 condemnation of Feuerbach's work thus hinges on this "bourgeois" blindness to see human activity as the only basis for materialism.
In a typically less nuanced manner, Engels also confirms the rejection of intuitive-contemplative approaches to materialism when he writes: "Feuerbach's 'conception' of the sensuous world is confined on the one hand to mere contemplation of it, and on the other to mere feeling" (Marx and Engels 1976, 39) . The aim of both Marx's and Engels's critique of Feuerbach's intuitivecontemplative approach is to highlight that materialism can only be understood as the product of industry and not as the outcome of an unproductive (and thereby simply intuitive-contemplative) apprehension of reality. As is well known, materialism is exclusively for them a historical product, the result of the activity of a whole succession of generations, each standing on the shoulders of the preceding one, developing its industry and its intercourse and modifying its social system according to changed needs. Because it rests on a seemingly unproductive ground (Anschauung), Feuerbach's own take on reality is thereby idealistic and defective and can only therefore be abandoned.
But it is not just Feuerbach who is dismissed for relying on an intuitivecontemplative (Anschauung) approach to materialism. As is well known, during the same period, Marx also dismisses Hegel's own intuitivecontemplative approach. In the strongest of terms, Marx writes in "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole" that Hegel's aim in The Encyclopedia Logic is only to turn an abstract thought into a materialist one on the sole basis of a meaningless "feeling." He writes: [Hegel's] entire transition from logic to natural philosophy is nothing else but the transition . . . from abstracting to intuiting (Anschauen). The mystical feeling which drives the philosopher forward from abstract thinking to intuiting is boredom-the longing for content. (Marx 2007, 167) For Marx, then, Hegel's materialism is based on an empty intuitioncontemplation that effectively serves nothing except a bored longing for some real content. With this corollary condemnation of Hegel's philosophy, Marx thus confirms his deliberations with Feuerbach that intuition-contemplation (Anschauung) is only a trick that allows "bourgeois" philosophers to claim some kind of purchase on reality when, in fact, it only serves to confirm their own abstract thoughts totally unanchored in real life.
Considering such condemnations, the question that inevitably begs to be asked here is this, What is lost and/or what is gained from this condemnation of intuition-contemplation? The question is obviously not why intuitioncontemplation is no longer a viable approach to materialism. Marx's entire oeuvre clearly attests to the problems incurred by this exclusive reliance on intuition-contemplation as an abstract ground for materialism. To address these questions and fulfill this speculative aim, I will first attempt to rethink this pairing (intuition-contemplation) that both Marx and Engels reject by addressing the German word they use (and everyone else after them uses): Anschauung. What is it about this famous word of German philosophy that they find so repellent, so abhorrent? Once a (hopefully) clearer analysis of this word is accomplished, I will attempt to rethink it in the context of a Marxist approach to materialism and, more specifically, to the way relations of production and labor take place. The field of research is here limited exclusively to a specific lineage of thought in the vast global Marxist scholarship on this pointy topic, namely, the readings put forward by key French
Marxists: Bloch, Henry, Althusser, Macherey, and Balibar. It does not aim to be exhaustive of the topic or comprehensive of the various linguistic, philosophical, historical, political, and/or ideological approaches to the issue at hand. "apprehension," or "contemplation" and, more rarely, "at-sight" (Editor 1892, 530) and "the given" (Suchting 1986, 47 what offers itself to consciousness. That is, these three words stand for the "given" as it is grasped by mankind before abstraction and conceptualization.
From these three words, Marx then interprets the way this "given" is conceived: either as "object" or through "intuition-contemplation" (Anschauung).
How is one to make sense of this double rejection?
Marx's alternative between "object" and "intuition-contemplation" is simply an attempt to highlight two misguided approaches to materialism. The first one takes the "given" as an object of understanding and not for what it "is." The second one takes this "given" through an immediate and sensual apprehension devoid of objectification. The fallacy that Marx highlights here is that this "given" cannot be apprehended through either of these approaches alone. It must be approached, as the first thesis shows, as praxis, that is, as an active undertaking or, as he says, as a "human sensuous activity" (sinnlich menschliche). 10 What is crucial in this first thesis is that Marx doesn't exactly reject the previous two approaches; he simply shows that alone they are insufficient. There cannot be a purely objectifying relation to the "given" and there cannot be a purely fusional and ecstatic rapport to it, called "intuitivecontemplative." Only through a predominantly active approach to this "given"
can materialism take off.
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But what exactly do Marx and Engels privilege instead exactly? How is one to understand this "human activity or praxis" in the way it was formulated in 1845? The answer, I think, is simple: Marx and Engels reject, first, "object," because it is too abstract and detached and, second, "intuitioncontemplation," because it is essentially passive. Neither of these approaches
represents activity as such and therefore the true revolutionary process of materialism. For them, the proper way to apprehend reality is through its active processes, the way the subject and the object interact with each other, and no objectification or passive intuition-contemplation can ever render this singlehandedly. As Ernst Bloch explains: "the earlier materialism . . . lacked that permanently oscillating subject-object relationship which is known as labor.
For this reason, Feuerbach still interpreted things, reality, and sensuous materiality 'in the form of objects' and apart from 'sensuous human activity'" (Bloch 1971, 67) . The old German and "bourgeois" approach to reality, including that of Feuerbach, is therefore devoid of history, alien to the subject-object relationship, and therefore unrepresentative of praxis properly speaking. This leads Bloch to conclude: "Feuerbach . . . view[ed] the object in an antiquated 'aristocratic' way . . . He looked down at action from his lofty position, and saw it only as a sordid undertaking" (Bloch 1971, 72 ). Marx's and Engels's privileging of human activity or praxis is therefore an attempt to foreground a real subject-object relation as the principal constitution of reality and thus puts forward the true and only construction of history, the result of the product of labor.
Can there be another way of going about it? To see whether Anschauung can be understood differently than as a useless passive process and to evaluate its importance within the context of a "scientific" approach to materialism, it is necessary to explore further this term, especially the way it is interpreted by two of Marx's most astute commentators: Etienne Balibar and Michel Henry. Let's start with Balibar.
I I . P R A X I S , P O I E S I S , T H E O R I A A N D T H E I M P E R A T I V E O F A C T I O N
Balibar explains Marx's dismissal of the word Anschauung by referencing the trio: praxis, poiesis, theoria. For him, Marx opens up a new way of understanding this trio, one that excludes Anschauung precisely because of its passive connotation. He begins by examining Marx's use of the first two terms (praxis, poiesis). Since the Greeks, praxis is basically free action in which man realizes and transforms himself, eventually seeking to attain his own perfection. As for poiesis (from the verb poiein: to make), it is basically necessary action, subject to all the constraints of the relationship with nature, that is, with its material conditions. The perfection it seeks is not that of man but of things, products J e a n -P a u l M a r t i n o n 8 1 for use. Here, then, is the first aspect of Marx's new materialism: not a mere inversion of the hierarchy-that is, a primacy accorded to poiesis over praxis by virtue of its direct relationship with matter-but the identification of the two or, as Balibar says, "the revolutionary thesis that praxis constantly passes over into poiesis and vice versa" (Balibar 2017, 41 ).
Balibar then explains that Marx uses the third term (theoria) not in the old sense of a mental scheme but in a new sense, that is, as an active philosophical practice evacuated of all forms of passivity. He writes:
Now, such a thesis cannot but affect the third term of the classical triptych: theoria or "theory" . . . As a counterpart to the "practice = production" equation established there, The German Ideology makes a decisive sideways move:
it identifies theoria with a "production of consciousness"; or, more precisely, with one of the terms of the historical contradiction to which the production of consciousness gives rise. That term is, in fact, ideology, Marx's second innovation of 1845, by way of which he was, as it were, proposing to philosophy that it view itself in the mirror of practice. (Balibar 2017, 41) The third element in the classical trio, theoria, is thus no longer understood as a contemplative intellectual undertaking close to Anschauung but as a mirror of activity itself, the effective production of consciousness. If one follows Balibar, it then becomes clear that with Marx, theoria has effectively been evacuated of its contemplative dimension, making it the third element of a purely active undertaking: free (praxis), necessary (poiesis), and conscious (theoria).
The old expression of German speculative philosophy, Anschauung, can only therefore be rejected because it is essentially antithetic to the new active trio proposed by Marx. Basically, in an all-active apprehension of "the given," Anschauung must once again be cast aside. returns, once again, to the classic apprehension of intuition as a form of unveiling or revelation. For him, intuition does not create beings; it reveals being itself. As he says, "intuition has this ultimate phenomenological meaning: it is this and no more than this. It unveils beings, it is this unveiling as such" (Henry 1983, 131) . When later on, in the same text, Henry asks himself why Marx rejects so categorically this "unveiling" intuition, he explains, in no uncertain terms, that it is because, in the end, intuition is incapable of displaying in itself "the being of action." He writes: "Acting is not intuiting, it is not seeing, it is not looking. In as much as intuition takes place, in as much as we live in it, in as much as we 'intuit,' we are not acting" (Henry 1983, 142) . The contrast between action and intuition could not, once again, be clearer:
intuition-contemplation (Anschauung) is most simply everything that Marxist materialism should not be. No action, properly conceived within a scientific materialist framework, needs this old term of German idealist philosophy.
But Henry realizes that this cannot be so simple. He also notes that in some instances, it is possible that action takes place at the same time as intuition-contemplation. For example, we can contemplate what we are doing as a way of assuring ourselves that our action is indeed going in the general direction of the goal we are pursuing. Intuition-contemplation is therefore a way of correcting or surveying the action. In this context, Anschauung might not be as useless after all. But this is not to be. Very quickly, he writes, as if catching himself off guard, that the two, in the end, must be distinguished:
However, action, considered in itself has nothing to do with this gaze of intuition with the discovery of a spectacle with the appearing of an object.
Discovering a spectacle, contemplating it, living in the presence of an object is, precisely, not acting. (Henry 1983, 142-43) Intuition-contemplation cannot therefore be understood in any active sense, not even as that of directing or controlling the activity under way. Activity or praxis understood in a purely Marxist sense, must be, once more, devoid of any contemplative intuiting, and this simply because, as Henry says, that is how we really act in our lives: "without having the intuition of our action . . . without looking at it, without giving it to ourselves as an object" (Henry 1983, 143) . Crucially, Henry concludes his analyses of the problem of intuition in relation to materialism by saying that if one gets rid of intuitioncontemplation, then praxis effectively comes to the fore. The rejection is in fact necessary; it constitutes the fundamental tenet of dialectical materialism.
Action is indeed only possible if it is not intuition because the essence (or being) of action is, in the end, totally foreign to that of intuition. In this way, to move on from an idealist approach to materialism that generates a living reality petrified by the gaze, it is therefore necessary to give action all its due, that is, to allow it to just "act." be what I myself am-a subject, a real and self-activating being. (Feuerbach 1986, 40; translation modified) As this extract shows, contrary to thought, which only serves as possessing objects and rendering us intolerant, Anschauung does something positive: it allows the person intuiting-contemplating to become a subject. In other words, intuition-contemplation, this letting go of objectification, allows us to be selfactivating subjects.
15 Anschauung is thereby an empowering process that is neither passive nor possessive and aims ultimately to curb the excesses of thought and objectification, thus avoiding taking oneself (and others) as object(s).
In his Provisional Theses for the Reformation of Philosophy, written during
the same period, Feuerbach further confirms this dual role of thought and intuition-contemplation, the former being a mediating and objectifying process, the latter being an unmediated access to subjectivity. He writes:
Thought is the principle governing school and all systems. Intuition (Anschauung) is the principle of life. In intuition, I am at the mercy of the object, in thought I determine the object. In thought, I am "me," in intuition, I am "non-me" . . . Intuition gives the unmediated essence of existence as one, thought gives the mediated essence of existence as distinction." (Feuerbach 1972, 120-21 "Thought does not follow a straight line within its self-identity, but is always interrupted by sensuous intuition (Anschauung)" (Feuerbach 1986, 64) . In other words, thought cannot effectively take place independently of intuitioncontemplation: it needs it to carry out its objectifying tasks. But why should this matter? Because, for Feuerbach, without intuition-contemplation, thought effectively only leads to itself, it only operates in complete circularity, and such autism never manages, in the end, to access reality. To have a proper access to reality, to avoid the dangers of a system locked in the circularity of thought, it is necessary to have something radically alien to thought:
So this is what Anschauung is for: it not only gives the possibility of thought, it also and above all gives access to reality, including being itself.
Without the intertwinement of the two, reality cannot be accessed, materialism cannot move, production and labor remain in deadlock, always pointing back to itself. Feuerbach summarizes his approach to the twin issue of thought/intuition-contemplation:
Sensuous intuition (Anschauung) takes things in a broad sense, but thought takes them in the narrowest sense; intuition leaves things in their unlimited freedom, but thought imposes on them laws that are only too often despotic; intuition introduces clarity into the head, but without determining or deciding anything; thought performs a determining function, but it also often makes the mind narrow; intuition in itself has no principles and thought in itself has no life; the rule is the way of thought and exception to the rule is that of intuition. (Feuerbach 1986, 65) So intuition-contemplation is really not the only way Feuerbach accesses reality, and it does not found, contra Marx, his materialism exclusively. There cannot be reality without both thought and intuition-contemplation, and it is the two, taken together, that are the active-passive agents giving us the materiality of the world.
As he writes, again in the Principles of the Philosophy of the Future:
The thought that is identical, and exists in an uninterrupted continuity, with itself, lets the world circle, in contradiction to reality, around itself as its center; but the thought that is interrupted through . . . the anomaly of intuition (Anschauung), transforms this circular movement into an elliptical one in accordance with the truth. (Feuerbach 1986, 65) Such an approach to reality gives us a type of philosophy that cannot therefore be confined exclusively, as Marx and others imagined, to a type of passive project, the aristocratic gazing of the world from above, untainted by the objectifying modes of production. On the contrary, Feuerbach's philosophy is one that identifies Anschauung and thought as the two components structuring not only praxis but also poiesis and theoria. Feuerbach's materialist project is indeed one that neither reduces everything to "pure action" (Balibar) nor ejects "passive" intuition as the real obstacle to the being of action (Henry) but intertwines both object (thought) and intuition-contemplation (Anschauung)
to apprehend, as Marx desperately wants, "the thing, reality, [and] sensuousness (der Gegenstand, die Wirklichkeit, Sinnlichkeit)." Feuerbach resolves the essence of religion into the essence of man (menschliche Wesen = "human nature"). But the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations. (Marx and Engels 2008, 71) As has been commented many times, this famous thesis attempts to designate the importance of the displacement that is needed between an understanding of man as a single abstract monad and as an ensemble of real social relations.
18
The shift from singularity to multiplicity forces philosophy to move from the reified realm of abstraction that has characterized it to date into a materialist approach to reality that leaves no space for idealism ("in reality"-"In seiner Wirklichkeit"), thus opening up a truly revolutionary work that Marx envisaged as to-come. In other words, with this famous thesis, there can be no more (in-)finite abstract supraentities, such as Being or Spirit lording over or structuring reality, but a concert of concrete social relations, the true modus operandi of the new materialism of the future.
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However, while the move from abstraction-singularity to materialismmultiplicity is an undeniable key change in Marx's thought, 20 one must not forget that the ensemble he suggests as an alternative to idealist materialism is effectively never fixed; it is always in movement. 21 In other words, the ensemble of social relations is always in a permanent state of restructuration (Selbstveränderung). Marx uses this expression three theses earlier:
The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change (Selbstveränderung) can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionizing practice. (Marx and Engels 2008, 70) What this previous thesis shows is that for social relations to be essentially "revolutionary," or "unwälzende" as Engels suggests in his own editorial This is where Feuerbach's own interpretation of Anschauung becomes crucial. To make sense of the movement implied in Marx's Selbstveränderung, I feel it is necessary to rethink the ensemble as essentially structured by both rational thought and intuitive-contemplation. If one indeed keeps in mind our rereading of this much maligned Feuerbachian term, then the revolutionary ensemble that Marx proposes must also take into account not only subjectobject relations, that is, the modes of productions and labor, but also all that which always already escapes them, and this includes the intuitionscontemplations that structure them. If Feuerbach is right in believing that no rational thought, and therefore no labor relation, can take place without intuition-contemplation, then Marx's ensemble cannot truly function without it, not as a foundational empty abstraction à la Hegel, but, most simply, as a key constitutive element of the ensemble. The ensemble needs Anschauung to keep this permanent state of restructuration (Selbstveränderung) that prevents it from ossifying into relations of production for its own sake, that is, into a revolution that knows no resolution in sight. In other words, the displacement that is offered here with Feuerbach's own interpretation of this word is that the ensemble is no longer just structured by history, it is also structured by what surprises it, that is, by what interrupts its very process every second of time and says, intuitively, "this way!" There can be no new ensemble without it. It stands for one of the motors in the self-change of the production of material existence; its very opening onto infinity.
In this way, once Marx's condemnation of intuition-contemplation is rethought in a sense that is neither passive nor absolute, but undecidedly active and passive at once, we can then finally move, as his last thesis (11) famously suggests, from a philosophy that only seeks to interpret the world to one that truly seeks to change it. But this time, it will no longer be a revolution against an old philosophy-that is, pure action against aristocratic contemplation-but a revolution that seeks to empower the ensemble both as action for change and as intuition-contemplation for change, a dual gesture that concerns not just modes of production or forms of labor but also the activitypassivity of self-restructuration of the ensemble itself. When this will materialize itself, the ensemble will then truly reflect what it is made up of: humans that are able to put forward a rational thought and interrupt it altogether, tackle the real and intuit it at the same time, participate in production and labor without fossilizing them in conceptual oppressions, and create use values without also assuming them to be exclusively and necessarily exchange values. It is only then that the Marxist materialist revolution intimated in 1845 will acquire, beyond Capital, its fulfilling dimension, one in which it recognizes each component of the ensemble as made up of humans who don't just make history but invent and surprise it too, each and every one of them in modes hereto unheard of. After all, growth, however it is understood, is driven not by productivity alone but above all by knowledge at the cusp of reason.
Can this foster a new name and therefore a new horizon for Marx's praxis?
If "the given" (der Gegenstand, die Wirklichkeit, Sinnlichkeit) is no longer understood predominantly through activity, that is, as praxis-poiesis-theoria, but above all through the activity-passivity that allows the ensemble to restructure itself every second of time (rational thought + intuition-contemplation),
should it then not foster a different appellation, a new term for the future? In a surprising reading of Heidegger's work, Jean-Luc Nancy translates, at one point in his analyses, the Greek term praxis by "to conduct oneself" (se conduire), thus emphasizing through its etymology (from the Latin verb conducere, "bringing together") the social mode of any praxis. 24 If Marx's primary emphasis is indeed praxis, and therefore subject-object relations, and if, on our account, these relations must be understood with the added benefit of intuition-contemplation (Anschauung), do we then not have here an invitation to "conduct oneself" over and beyond the simple call for more active praxis, poiesis, and theoria? In other words, to form an ensemble, to be part of such an ensemble, one must effectively not just "act" but also, and above all, "conduct oneself," and that implies a certain amount of intuitioncontemplation, Anschauung. The future of any ensemble is therefore not an apocalypse or a communist ideal imagined on the horizon and arrived at by mere productive toiling alone but most simply the recurrent call to "conduct ourselves" so that the said ensemble continues to maintain itself forever in its very own self-restructuration (Selbstveränderung).
N O T E S 1. On this topic, see Macherey (2008, 131-32) .
2. There is, unfortunately, no space here to unpack this well-known argument that sees 1917-29 as a crucial turning point in history in which Marxism floundered because instead of the overthrow of capital liberating its productive potential, these crises led in fact to the self-destruction of that very potential. See Negri (1988) .
3. With such a statement, I deliberately circumscribe the issue of Anschauung to only reflect pure intuition (i.e., intuition that cannot be inferred or explained a posteriori). In doing so, I therefore bypass the much larger issue of intuitions as they are analyzed in the fields of linguistic or behaviorist theories. For Kant's pure intuition, see Kant (1993, especially A19/B77) .
4. And, therefore, to the interpretation of intuition given by Descartes, namely, as a type of self-evident knowledge gained through rational-but not-deductive-reasoning. See Descartes (1997) .
As is well known, Henri Bergson famously inverts this interpretation when he says that
intuition-and not Anschauung-is not something that reveals itself to consciousness J e a n -P a u l M a r t i n o n 9 1 but is the act of entering it and in doing so, "seizing ourselves from within." There is, Husserl (1983) . For an analysis of Husserl's use of these terms, see Lévinas (1973) and Hintikka (2003 intersecting chords form equally necessary, but invisible rectangles. Unlike the circle, the chords and rectangles don't actually exist in space and time. They are dependent on the circle to exist but "are" not "there," properly speaking. Spinoza's third kind of knowledge is therefore not a process that singlehandedly touches upon an elsewhere but operates at the indecision of what is in and out of space and time. As such, Spinoza's vision therefore involves both an adequate set of ideas about the properties of things (i.e., knowledge of the second kind, in Spinoza's taxonomy) and one that defies all forms of rationality (i.e., knowledge of the third kind, intuition). See Spinoza (1992) . For an analysis of Spinoza's understanding of intuition, see, among others, Soyarslan (2013) . For a comparison between Spinoza and Feuerbach, see Bensussan (2008) , and for insightful comparisons between Spinoza and Marx, see among a vast literature Negri (1991) , Holland (1998 ), Fischbach (2005 , and Tosel (2008) .
9. For an analysis of Marx's Theses in English, see Suchting (1979; . Although I don't agree with his analyses of the Theses, mainly because he translates Anschauung with "the given," thus missing out on an important aspect of Marx's critique, Suchting's studies constitute excellent introductions to these early works in English.
10. I leave aside here, for lack of space, the enormous issue of sensuousness and its relationship to reality and materialism.
11. I use the word "predominantly" to emphasize that Marx does not intend, as is well known, pure action as such or actus purus in the idealist manner of Moses Hess or Karl Grün.
12. The problem with the rest of Henry's commentary is that he then moves on, contrary to Marx, to conflate both object and intuition as well as intuition and seeing as if these were all interchangeable or synonymous. First, Marx clearly writes in thesis one, "object or intuition" (Objekts oder der Anschauung). There is no amalgamation of the theoretical process of objectification and that of intuition, but a clear alternative. Second, Marx never confuses intuition with seeing exclusively. As the ambivalent use of the word Anschauung shows, intuition is not necessarily contemplation. For the way Henry finishes his argument conflating all these terms, see Henry (1983, 145 and again, 153-57) .
13. On this history, see Chamberlain (1941) , Kamenka (1970) , Wartofsky (1977) , and Dellaï (2011).
14. Taken 15. There is unfortunately no space here to compare this Feuerbachian idea with Fichte's Thathandlung, which also intertwines thought and intuition. Suffice to say that while Fichte's leads to transcendental subjectivist idealism, Feuerbach's leads instead to social materialism. See Fichte (1994, especially 47-49) .
16. I give this translation instead of the one found in English for the simple reason that it is more representative of Feuerbach's overall thought. Here is Lawrence S. Stepelevich's translation: "Thinking is the principle of the school, of the system; intuition, the principle of life. In intuition, I am determined by an object, in thinking I determine the object. In thinking, I am an 'I,' in intuition a 'not-I.' . . . The intuition yields simply the essence immediately identical with existence. Thinking yields the essence mediated by its distinction and its separation from existence" (Stepelevich 1983, 164) .
17. Unfortunately, there is no space here to explore this problematic analogy. Bloch is the only author who makes this comparison between passive intuition-contemplation and the feminine, albeit without realizing the problems that such a comparison entails. He indeed writes without hesitation that "Feuerbach effeminizes humanity" (Bloch 1971, 86) .
While the Feuerbachian reading proposed in this essay may suggest that issues of gender have been subsumed under a generic (and therefore male) characteristic of human relations ("we" all intuit/reason), the sought-after renewal of Marx's ensemble it ultimately J e a n -P a u l M a r t i n o n 9 3 aims to achieve should be seen, on the contrary, as a mandate to study the role and participation of all gender and gender identifications in their own oppressions, their engagement in social relations, their need for self-change, and their subjection as part of the ensemble. For a rare attempt to read Marx's 1845 Theses through the lens of gender, see Haug (2015) .
18. Thus, echoing, as has been commented a few times before, Feuerbach's own understanding of being: "Sein ist Gemeinschaft," Being is community (Feuerbach 1980, 122) .
19. Which Marx will later formulate with such expressions as "The human being is in the most literal sense a Zoon politikon not merely a gregarious animal, but an animal which can individuate itself only in the midst of society" (Marx 1993, 84) .
20. A move, let us hasten to emphasize, made way before Heidegger's complex analyses of mit-dasein and its many avatars, including Nancy's being-singular-plural. See, among others, Nancy (1992) .
21. For an interpretation of the sixth thesis that evinces this contingent movement to recuperate a supposedly totalizing sense to human nature in Marx, see the very thorough Geras
